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ABSTRACT
A system of shared corporate governance between shareholders and
workers, codetermination has been mostly ignored within the U.S. corporate
governance literature. When it has made an appearance, it has largely served
as a foil for shareholder primacy and an example of corporate deviance.
However, over the last twenty years—and especially in the last five—empirical
research on codetermination has shown surprising results as to the system’s
efficiency, resilience, and benefits to stakeholders. This Article reviews the
extant American legal scholarship on codetermination and provides a fresh look
at the current state of codetermination theory and practice. Rather than
experiencing the failures predicted by our law-and-economics framework of
shareholder primacy, codetermination has fared better than alternative systems,
particularly with respect to the ravages of the Global Financial Crisis. At a time
when corporate leaders, politicians, and academics are rethinking the
shareholder primacy model, the Article presents an updated perspective on
codetermination and invites U.S. scholars to reexamine their prior assumptions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
European codetermination—the system of corporate governance where
shareholders and employees share control—has long stood in contrapose to our
Anglo-American system of shareholder primacy. The contrast was not as stark
in the middle of the twentieth century, when a third of U.S. employees were
represented by unions, and corporate executives ruled with relative autonomy.
But as shareholders grew more assertive and academics pressed for a more
robust adherence to the primacy norm, the presence of employee representatives
on the corporate board became a point of divergence between Anglo-American
and Continental European companies.1 And by century’s end, the United States
had introduced its corporate governance model into the former Soviet-bloc
countries and endeavored to make it the international standard.2 Pure and
unadulterated shareholder wealth maximization was ascendant.
Academic attention to codetermination’s alternative governance model has
been, at best, somewhat spotty. Since the 1970s, codetermination has surfaced
in U.S. legal scholarship primarily as a counterexample, and occasionally as a
bête noire, for advocates of the dominant paradigm.3 Even supporters of
stakeholder governance—whose vision of the corporation involves paying
attention to the fortunes of all corporate constituents—have not paid it too much
attention. It can come across as an unusual creature, an odd duck—a tapir in a
world of horses, pigs, and cows.
Shareholder primacy, however, is losing some of its shine, and the corporate
governance establishment is just starting to look around for other models.4 In the
1

See CHRISTOPHER M. BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW
WORLD: THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF SHAREHOLDER POWER (2013) (discussing
the divergences between these models).
2
Merritt B. Fox & Michael A. Heller, Corporate Governance Lessons from Russian
Enterprise Fiascoes, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1720, 1721 (2000) (“After the fall of Russian
Communism, state enterprises were privatized rapidly, stock markets created, and a
corporate legal code adopted.”).
3
See Part III.B infra.
4
See, e.g., David Gelles & David Yaffe-Bellany, Shareholder Value Is No Longer
(Aug.
19,
2019),
Everything,
Top
C.E.O.s
Say,
N.Y.
TIMES
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meantime, codetermination has not disappeared—in fact, it seems to be thriving.
While the 2008-2009 financial crisis crippled economies across the globe,
systems with codetermination were more resilient than most.5 In particular,
Germany, with its distinctive and well-known version of worker participation,
has been an island of economic stability over the last twenty years. At a time
when academics, politicians, and business leaders are engaged in a dramatic
rethinking of the shareholder-oriented consensus, codetermination has been
hiding in plain sight.
While American scholars have had a small but somewhat steady diet of
articles and book chapters on codetermination, this literature is significantly
undersized, especially relative to the attention lavished on the minutiae of
shareholder primacy. A deeper dive into the workings of codetermination is
critical now that ESG investors are pushing for more than happy talk and the
shareholder primacy model is losing its grip. Fortuitously, a surge in economic
research on codetermination provides a rich vein for investigation by corporate
law scholars, who have immersed themselves in economic analysis since the
1970s.
This paper explores codetermination, with a focus on German
codetermination, in theory and practice. Part II establishes the basics of
codetermination and briefly reviews both the U.S. and German experience with
employee representation. Part III explores codetermination in theory,
particularly within the literature on shareholder primacy from the last forty years
of research. Part IV discusses the recent economic literature on codetermination,
particularly its effects on economic performance, shareholders, and other
stakeholders. We believe that American scholars need to make codetermination
part of the corporate governance research agenda, and we hope this article
provides an entry point for our cohort.
II. WHAT IS CODETERMINATION?
Shareholder primacy is so entrenched in American corporate law and
scholarship that it sometimes seems difficult to imagine any other way of
thinking about the corporation. This lack of imagination may help explain why
arguments for the exclusive shareholder franchise continue to plod along in the
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/19/business/business-roundtable-ceoscorporations.html.
5
See Part IV.A infra.
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background of an awful lot of corporate governance scholarship. It has certainly
kept many legal scholars from seriously considering alternative models. There
are, however, good examples of such models, some of which have been around
for a century. What’s more: they specifically involve employee representation
on corporate boards.
“Codetermination” is the umbrella term for systems in which workers play
an official role in corporate governance. Germany has the most well-known
system of codetermination, but other European countries such as Austria,
Poland, Denmark, and Sweden have provided employees with a variety of the
form.6 The term itself reflects the principle of shared governance—the joint
management of enterprise between capital and labor.7 As a broader principle,
codetermination sometimes encompasses other methods of worker-management
cooperation, such as works councils or interest arbitration.8 However, more
frequently it refers specifically to designated worker representation on corporate
boards.9
6

Jens Dammann, The Mandatory Law Puzzle: Redefining American Exceptionalism in
Corporate Law, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 441, 478 (2014) (“Many other European countries
including Austria, France, Poland, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and the Netherlands
have also adopted some type of codetermination regime.”); Klaus J. Hopt, Labor
Representation on Corporate Boards: Impacts and Problems for Corporate
Governance and Economic Integration in Europe, 14 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 203, 203
(1994) (“Labor participation on corporate boards exists in many European countries,
albeit in very different forms and degrees.”).
7
Clyde W. Summers, Employee Voice and Employer Choice: A Structured Exception
to Section 8(a)(2), 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 129, 133 (1993) (finding that under
codetermination, workers are “considered members of the enterprise and entitled to a
voice in its decisions, with a share in the enterprise because of their contribution to its
production and profitability”).
8
Id. at 135-36; see also Julian Constain, A New Standard for Governance: Reflections
on Worker Representation in the United States, 24 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 409,
412-13 (2019) (“German codetermination operates in two distinct ways. First, it exists
at the shop level through workers’ councils; second, it exists at the corporate level
through the representation of workers on supervisory boards.”).
9
See, e.g., Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Tailored Claims and Governance:
The Fit Between Employees and Shareholders, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 121, 147-48 (Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe eds., 1999) (noting that
codetermination “refers to employee representatives on the board of directors”); Henry
Hansmann, When Does Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law Firms,
Codetermination, and Economic Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1749, 1753 (1990) (defining
German codetermination as a system “under which workers in all large corporations are
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In this survey we focus on German codetermination because of its notoriety,
its comprehensive nature, and the importance of Germany to the international
economy. First, however, we look to the history of codetermination and worker
participation within the United States.
A. Codetermination in the United States
In the United States, corporate boards have been almost exclusively the
domain of shareholders.10 While the United States has some history of employee
participation on corporate boards, it’s pretty thin gruel.11 Because state law
dictates corporate governance, a system of codetermination would be up to the
states to implement, absent future federalization. The oldest state
codetermination law still in force is a 1919 Massachusetts statute that expressly
allows a corporation to have employee representatives on its board.12 That law,
however, is permissive, and after a brief boomlet of participating companies at
the time of its passage, there’s not much evidence that Massachusetts
corporations have made use of the option.13 Corporate boards have remained
free from mandated employee representation under state law.
Despite its absence from corporate law, the idea of employee board
representation in practice has waxed and waned over the years.14 As a general
matter, unions have largely been uninterested or opposed to the idea, as they
have feared that board representation might lead to cooptation, compromise, and
entitled to elect up to half of the company’s board of directors”); Hopt, supra note 6, at
203; Marleen A. O’Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate
Law to Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 936
(1993) (“Under the German system of codetermination, workers elect representatives
to serve on supervisory boards of directors that engage in strategic corporate
decisionmaking.”).
10
See Matthew T. Bodie, Employees and the Boundaries of the Corporation, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 85, 86-87 (Claire A.
Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2012) (discussing the general structure of American
corporate governance and noting that employees have “no role”).
11
For a comprehensive rundown, see Ewan McGaughey, Democracy in America at
Work: The History of Labor’s Vote in Corporate Governance, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
697 (2019).
12
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156, § 23 (2018); see McGaughey, supra note 11, at 718.
13
McGaughey, supra note 11, at 718-19.
14
Brian Hamer, Serving Two Masters: Union Representation on Corporate Boards of
Directors, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 639, 639 (1981) (“Employee representation on corporate
boards of directors is not a new idea in the United States.”).
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weakness.15 In the 1970s, however, labor engaged in several (ultimately
unsuccessful) efforts for board representation at individual companies. In their
role as shareholders, workers and union pension funds introduced proxy
proposals for employee board representation at companies like Ford, AT&T, and
United Airlines.16 Unions were only successful in their efforts when working
with management as part of overall labor negotiations. In 1973, a small railroad
company agreed to board representation as part of a collective bargaining
agreement.17 In 1980, the United Auto Workers secured a board seat for its
president at Chrysler, and a union member was elected at Pan American Airways
in 1982.18 Chrysler’s board seat for the union president ended in 1991 but was
then revived when it was purchased by the German corporation Daimler-Benz.19
The only other significant instances of employee board representation came
through instances of employee ownership. Employee ownership refers to
ownership structures through which employees hold a significant or majority
stake in the enterprise. Workers could, of course, simply buy up the stock in their
employer individually, assuming that the shares are publicly sold.20 But the
capital required for a meaningful percentage of equity are well-beyond most
employees’ means. Instead, different vehicles have been developed to facilitate
employee participation in ownership.
The most common set of ownership vehicles falls under the category of
ESOPs—employee stock ownership plans.21 Rather than individual holders, the
ESOP provides an investment vehicle which holds a controlling equity stake in
15

Id. (“Union and business leaders in this country, however, have consistently opposed
employee representation, favoring instead exclusive reliance on the adversarial process
of collective bargaining.”).
16
McGaughey, supra note 11, at 729-30.
17
Davison Douglas, Labor Unions in the Boardroom: An Antitrust Dilemma, 92 YALE
L.J. 106, 106 n.1 (1982).
18
Id.
19
Although framed as a “merger of equals,” Chrysler was subsumed into Daimler-Benz
and fell under the German laws of codetermination. See BILL VLASIC & BRADLEY A.
STERTZ, TAKEN FOR A RIDE: HOW DAIMLER-BENZ DROVE OFF WITH CHRYSLER 238
(2000).
20
Federal securities regulations would complicate matters if the employees constitute
an investment group. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(1) & (2).
21
Robert Hockett, Why (Only) ESOPs?, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 84, 88 (2006) (“In
speaking of ESOPs (or ‘plans’), one can be speaking of any of several distinct, cognate
kinds of financial arrangement.”). For an overview of different ESOP types, see JOSEPH
R. BLASI, EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP: REVOLUTION OF RIPOFF? 64-84 (1988).
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the company. Essentially, a chunk of the employer’s equity is transferred to the
plan, and the plan pays back the corporation for the value of the shares. Most
ESOPs fund the purchase of stock through debt that is secured through the stock
as well as a pledge from the employer.22 Employees participate in the ESOP not
as shareholders but as beneficiaries. Because an ESOP plan falls under ERISA,
it provides tax benefits as well as fiduciary obligations to its participants—the
employees.23 Publix Super Markets, the largest employee-owned company in
the United States, is owned by employees through an ESOP as well as the
company’s 401(k) plan.24
Although ESOPs may appear to provide employees with participation in
governance through ownership, the reality is much more removed. Because
ESOPs are trusts, they are controlled and managed by trustees on behalf of the
beneficiaries. Trustees control voting rights over the shares and need only vote
in the employees’ interests as beneficiaries of the trust. 25 This means that
trustees need only try to maximize the value of the shares by pursuing traditional
corporate governance strategies; there is no duty to workers qua workers.26
Because of this structure, management officials have used ESOPs to secure their
own power against hostile takeovers without providing any real voice to
employees.27
22

Hockett, supra note 21, at 88-89.
29 U.S.C. § 1107; Hockett, supra note 21, at 88-89.
24
Alicia E. Plerhoples, Representing Social Enterprise, 20 CLINICAL L. REV. 215, 228
(2013).
25
See Matthew M. O’Toole, The Disproportionate Effects of an ESOP’s Proportional
Voting, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 824, 828 (1991).
26
See Jedidiah J. Kroncke, ESOPs and the Limits of Fractionalized Ownership, 2017
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 287, 297 (2017) (“For public companies, ESOP employees could vote
their shares as would normal stock owners, but for privately held companies, as were
and are the majority of ESOPs, the trustee controlled the voting power of unallocated
and allocated shares alike, except on issues of corporate sales or ownership
realignments.”).
27
Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Labor Law Obstacles to the Collective Negotiation and
Implementation of Employee Stock Ownership Plans: A Response to Henry Hansmann
and Other “Survivalists”, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 957, 960 (1998) (“Because an ESOP
can provide significant tax advantages to a company that needs increased cash flow, an
employer can create an ESOP that owns a majority of the company but gives employees
virtually no voice in managerial policy-making.”); Julie Lynn Kaufman, Democratic
ESOPs: Can Workers Control Their Future?, 5 LAB. LAW. 825, 825 (1989) (arguing
that “the majority of ESOPs are structured to skew stock ownership heavily towards
management” and “ESOP trusts thus become a means of perpetuating and entrenching
current managerial control”).
23
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There are few examples of ESOPs in which employee representatives
participated on the corporate board. In some cases, that representation has been
pursued by unions.28 In the mid-1990s, United Airlines restructured itself
through an ESOP purchase of 55 percent of the company.29 As part of the
transaction, which was negotiated with the union representatives of the pilots
and the machinists, two of the twelve directors’ seats were filled by union
representatives.30 That meant that along with one other employee director
representing non-union management and administrative employees, worker
directors only held a quarter of the board, despite the ESOP’s majority stake.31
United filed for bankruptcy in 2002 and the ESOP was ultimately dismantled.32
Workers cooperatives are another way to operationalize employee
ownership.33 Cooperatives are businesses owned and run by and for their
members, and worker cooperatives limit their membership to employees.34 Like
corporations, they are formed under state statutes. Unlike corporations, which
are structured for shareholder governance, worker cooperatives are specifically

28

Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Corporate Structure: Changing
Conceptions and Emerging Possibilities, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 78 (1988) (“Unions
also have tried to obtain direct ownership in corporations through the creation of
employee stock option plans with employee stock trusts, so as to have direct input into
corporate decisions.”).
29
Jeffrey N. Gordon, Employee Stock Ownership in Economic Transitions: The Case
of United Airlines, 10 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 39, 52 (1998).
30
Id. at 54 (“The board consist [ed] of [twelve] members: five ‘public directors,’ four
‘independent directors,’ two ‘union directors,’ and one ‘salaried and management’
director (the latter three directors known collectively as ‘employee directors’).”).
31
Id.
32
See Bill Fotsch & John Case, United’s Troubles Could Have Been Avoided, FORBES
(Apr. 17, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/fotschcase/2017/04/17/uniteds-troublescould-have-been-avoided/#40bea9d4c062; Farhad Manjoo, United’s ESOP Fable,
SALON.COM ( Dec. 13, 2002), https://www.salon.com/2002/12/12/esop/.
33
Linda D. Phillips, Worker Cooperatives: Their Time Has Arrived, 40 COLO. LAW.
33, 33 (2011).
34
Alicia Alvarez, Lawyers, Organizers, and Workers: Collaboration and Conflict in
Worker Cooperative Development, 24 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 353, 358 (2017)
(“The International Co-operative Alliance (ICA) defines a cooperative as ‘an
autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common economic,
social, and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly owned and democraticallycontrolled enterprise.’”).
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designed to provide employee governance.35 Each coop member participates in
management decisions and receives income distributions along the lines of a
traditional owner.36 These governance rights are not transferable and terminate
once the employee leaves employment. Because worker cooperatives must
forego outside capital investment, they are not suited for enterprises of any
substantial size and are relatively uncommon.37 Large cooperatives such as
Land-O-Lakes, Ace Hardware, and REI tend to have a wider membership that
includes consumers or other non-employee stakeholders.
Stock options have also proven a popular method to give employees a stake
in the success of the business. Along with other types of bonus plans, stock
options allow employees to participate in the employer’s growth by providing
profits based on increases in the share price.38 While proponents have touted the
benefits of employee stock options for incentivizing an ownership culture,39
options provide no governance power. Voting rights are only obtained if the
option is exercised, which requires a purchase with additional funds. Most
employees only exercise their options to cash in on the increase and then
immediately sell; they are not long-term holders.40 And that is probably a good
thing. Investing in employer stock leaves the employee extremely vulnerable to
the employer’s financial health. Workers with significant stock ownership are
essentially doubling down on one company—the exact opposite of a
diversification strategy recommended for personal savings.41 The experiences of

35

Ariana R. Levinson, Founding Worker Cooperatives: Social Movement Theory and
the Law, 14 NEV. L.J. 322, 323 (2014) (“The pure worker cooperative involves a legal
structure in which each employee has one equal share in the entity and one vote.”).
36
Scott L. Cummings, Developing Cooperatives as a Job Creation Strategy for LowIncome Workers, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 181, 186 (1999).
37
G. Mitu Gulati et. al., When A Workers’ Cooperative Works: The Case of Kerala
Dinesh Beedi, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1417, 1422 (2002) (“Worker cooperatives are
appealing in many ways, but they are rare.”); Levinson, supra note 35, at 323 (“Yet
despite the promise they hold, worker cooperatives are relatively rare in the United
States.”);
38
Matthew T. Bodie, Aligning Incentives with Equity: Employee Stock Options and
Rule 10b-5, 88 IOWA L. REV. 539, 546-47 (2003).
39
See, e.g., JOSEPH BLASI, DOUGLAS KRUSE & AARON BERNSTEIN, IN THE COMPANY
OF OWNERS: IN DEFENSE OF STOCK OPTIONS (2003).
40
Id. at 81 (noting that employees own “a much smaller amount” of actual stock than
their stock options).
41
The problem of lack of diversification is an endemic problem to employee ownership.
See Alan Hyde, In Defense of Employee Ownership, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 159, 207
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workers at Enron, many of whom had their 401(k) plans deeply invested in
Enron stock, illustrate the dangers of employee holdings of employer shares.42
Although putting one’s own pension in employer stock is dangerous
business, retirement funds are invested in a variety of mutual funds, index funds,
and other financial vehicles representing trillions of dollars.43 When these funds
are managed by unions, they can exert a strong presence on corporate
governance issues. Labor pension funds, especially large public-sector funds run
by CalPERS and AFSCME, have led the way in efforts to strengthen shareholder
voting rights, rein in the power of the CEO, and fight fraud and abuse by
insiders.44 However, they have made no play for a direct role in governance
through board representation. In examining the behavior of these funds as
shareholders, researchers have found not “a socialist or proletarian plot,” but
rather “a model for any large institutional investor attempting to maximize return
on capital.”45 Actual directors’ seats are not on the agenda, at least in the near
term.
Despite their relative absence from the economic scene, worker directors
are now very much in the policy spotlight. Both Senator Tammy Baldwin and
Senator Elizabeth Warren have introduced bills that would provide for worker
representation on boards. Senator Warren’s Accountable Capitalism Act would
provide for 40% employee board representation for companies that have more
than $1 billion in gross receipts;46 Senator Baldwin’s bill would provide for a

(1991) (“Risk diversification is thus in both theory and practice the most serious
problem with employee ownership as now practiced in the United States.”).
42
Susan J. Stabile, Is It Time to Admit the Failure of an Employer-Based Pension
System?, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 305, 313 (2007) (noting that “the publicity
associated with the disaster befalling participants in the 401(k) plans of companies like
Enron and Global Crossing have not resulted in a significant decline in the amount of
assets invested in employer securities”).
43
DAVID WEBBER, THE RISE OF THE WORKING-CLASS SHAREHOLDER: LABOR’S LAST
BEST WEAPON at xii (2018) (putting the valuation of worker pension funds at $3-6
trillion).
44
Id. at 45-78, 111-51, 172.
45
Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance:
Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018, 1019-20 (1998).
46
Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. § 6 (2018). See also Matthew
Ygelsias, Elizabeth Warren Has a Plan to Save Capitalism, VOX.COM (Aug. 15, 2018),
https://www.vox.com/2018/8/15/17683022/elizabeth-warren-accountable-capitalismcorporations.
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third of the board to worker representation for all publicly-listed companies.47
These bills reflect public sentiment supportive of employee participation in
corporate governance.48 Worker protest movements such as Google have
included board representation on their list of demands.49 And at a recent
presidential debate, Senator Bernie Sanders defended his proposal for worker
representation against claims of “communism.”50 Such proposals remain, at
present, only proposals. But the absolute control that shareholders have over
corporate governance is falling into contestation.
B. German Codetermination
Many European countries give employees some degree of access to
corporate boards.51 But the German system of codetermination offers the most
robust protection of employee representation. German codetermination has also
been in place for decades as part of a large, modern economy, making it the
obvious exemplar of such a system.52

47

Reward Work Act, S. 2605, 115th Cong. § 3(c)(2) (2018); H.R. 6096, 115th Cong. §
3(c)(2) (2018) (same); see also McGaughey, supra note 11, at 698-99.
48
Dylan Matthews, Workers don’t have much say in corporations. Why not give them
(Apr.
6,
2018),
seats
on
the
board?,
VOX.COM
https://www.vox.com/2018/4/6/17086720/poll-corporate-board-democracy-workercouncil-codetermination-union-labor (“A poll of more than 3,300 American likely
voters by Civis Analytics finds that a majority (53 percent) would support allowing
employees at large companies to elect representatives to those companies’ boards of
directors, thus giving employees a direct, democratic say in how the company is run.”).
49
Noam Scheiber, Google Workers Reject Silicon Valley Individualism in Walkout,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/06/business/googleemployee-walkout-labor.html.
50
Full Transcript: Ninth Democratic debate in full, NBCNEWS.COM (Feb. 19, 2020),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2020-election/full-transcript-ninth-democraticdebate-las-vegas-n1139546 (reporting that Sen. Sanders said, “I want workers to be able
to sit on corporate boards, as well, so they can have some say over what happens to their
lives,” and that Mayor Bloomberg called the proposal “ridiculous” and “communism”).
51
For a recent list of countries, see Ewan McGaughey, Votes at Work in Britain:
Shareholder Monopolisation and the “Single Channel,” 47 INDUS. L.J. 76, 79-80, 79
n.17, & 80 fig.1 (2018).
52
See Robert Scholz & Sigurt Vitols, Board-level Codetermination: A Driving Force
for Corporate Social Responsibility in German Companies?, 25 EUR. J. IND. REL. 233,
233-34 (2019).
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The term “codetermination” has been used to describe two different features
of German economic life.53 “Social codetermination” involves employee
representation on shop-level works councils at all companies with at least five
employees.54 The works councils have a broad range of rights in the workplace,
ranging from the right to receive economic and financial information to the right
of consultation on matters relating to the organization and structure of jobs to
the power to negotiate work agreements.55 “Supervisory codetermination,” on
the other hand, describes employee representation at the level of the corporate
board,56 and is of greater interest here.
Supervisory codetermination laws dictate the composition of the boards of
directors for large German companies.57 Unlike the United States, Germany uses
a two-tiered corporate board structure.58 The supervisory board provides more
general oversight of the company and appoints the members of the management
board.59 The management board runs the company, directing resources and
making the day-to-day business decisions.60 Management boards of larger
companies also have a personnel director responsible for all matters relating to

53

Here we are using the terminology from Otto Sandrock & Jean J. du Plessis, The
German System of Supervisory Codetermination by Employees, in GERMAN
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT 167, 169
(Jean J. du Plessis et al. eds., 3d ed. 2017).
54
See id. at 169-71.
55
See JOHN T. ADDISON, THE ECONOMICS OF CODETERMINATION: LESSONS FROM THE
GERMAN EXPERIENCE 16-19 (2009).
56
See Sandrock & du Plessis, supra note 53, at 169.
57
See id. at 172-78.
58
See Jean J. du Plessis et al., An Overview of German Business or Enterprise Law and
the One-Tier and Two-Tier Board Systems Contrasted, in GERMAN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT, supra note 53, at 1, 8-13.
59
See Jean J. du Plessis & Otto Saenger, The Supervisory Board as Company Organ,
in GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT,
supra note 53, at 105, 133-53; Jean J. du Plessis & Otto Saenger, The General Meeting
and the Management Board as Company Organs, in GERMAN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT, supra note 53, at 63, 73
[hereinafter du Plessis & Saenger, General Meeting].
60
Generally speaking, the two-tiered boards are probably better at supervising top
employees because there are fewer of the conflicts of interest that occur when managers
are on the corporate board; without those managers, though, information may flow to
the supervisory board more sluggishly.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3684690

2020]

CODETERMINATION

15

labor relations.61 The supervisory board is thus more analogous to the American
board of directors, while the officers in U.S. corporations share many of the
responsibilities of the management board.62
The degree of supervisory codetermination on German corporate boards
depends on the type of industry, the number of employees, and a few other
factors.63 Corporations with fewer than 500 employees have supervisory board
members elected solely by shareholders. However, corporations with 500 to
2000 employees typically have one-third of their board members elected by
employees (called, unsurprisingly, one-third board parity), and companies with
more than 2000 employees have one-half of their supervisory board members
elected by employees.64 In most of these large companies with one-half
codetermination, employees enjoy “quasi-parity” because shareholders elect the
chair (and potential tiebreaker vote). In the coal, iron, and steel industries,
however, there is a neutral chair (and tiebreaker), giving the employees “full
parity,” or a truly shared system of governance.65
Volkswagen workers have a unique arrangement, one that takes
codetermination to the next level. Originally a project of the German
government during the Nazi era, the company was transferred into private hands
in 1960. As part of the transfer, the government passed a special “Volkswagen
law” that gave seats on the supervisory board the local government of Lower
61

Depending on the level of codetermination (discussed below) the personnel director
has the support of the employee representatives of the supervisory board. For full-parity
codetermination governed by the 1952 law, employee representatives have veto power
over the appointment of the personnel director; for companies with quasi-parity
codetermination, personnel directors are usually not appointed unless they enjoy the
support of the employee representatives. See Otto Sandrock, German and International
Perspectives of the German Model of Codetermination, 26 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 129, 13132 (2015).
62
Thilo Kuntz, German Corporate Law in the 20th Century, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK
ON THE HISTORY OF CORPORATE AND COMPANY LAW 205 (Harwell Wells ed., 2018)
(discussing how supervisory directors had traditionally been part-time positions
somewhat removed from day-to-day governance, but have recently stepped up their
oversight roles).
63
See Sandrock & du Plessis, supra note 53, at 182-83.
64
See Jean J. du Plessis & Ingo Saenger, An Overview of the Corporate Governance
Debate in Germany, in GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL AND
EUROPEAN CONTEXT, supra note 53, at 17, 48-49; Sandrock & du Plessis, supra note
53, at 173-78; ADDISON, supra note 55, at 103; Sandrock, supra note 61, at 131-32.
65
See Sandrock & du Plessis, supra note 53, at 173-76. This is true of companies in
these sectors at a lower threshold—1000 instead of 2000 employees.
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Saxony.66 Because the government directors tended to side with the employees,
Volkswagen has a de facto worker majority.67
Over the last thirty years, Germany has followed certain international trends
in corporate governance: directors on supervisory boards have become more
professionalized and less insular; banks and insurance companies do not quite
have the same dominant shareholdings that they once had; and legislation has
required heightened auditing standards and shareholder rights.68 But the
movement—predicted by some—towards a shareholder primacy model has not
materialized. Rather, the 2008 financial crisis slowed, or even reversed, efforts
to bring Germany closer to the Anglo-American system.69 Germany’s particular
style of codetermination remains solidly entrenched within the German
economic system, as well the European and international political economy.
III. CODETERMINATION IN THEORY
So what have American corporate law scholars made of this alternative
version of corporate governance, one that actually exists in the form of flesh and
blood German supervisory boards? For decades, codetermination has received

66

Law of 21 July 1960 on the privatisation of equity in the Volkswagenwerk limited
company (Gesetz über die Überführung der Anteilsrechte an der Volkswagenwerk
Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung in private Hand, BGBl. 1960 I, p. 585, and
BGBl. 1960 III, p. 641-1-1.
67
In addition, individual Volkswagen shareholders were limited to a maximum of 20%
of the voting rights. In 2007, this limitation was overturned by the European Union
Court of Justice as a violation of the free movement of capital within the E.U. See Case
C-112/2005, dated 23 October 2007, Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany
“Volkswagen.” In response, Volkswagen changed its charter in 2009 to give directors
certain veto powers over plant closures and layoffs. For additional discussion of
Volkswagen’s unique governance, see JACK EWING, FASTER, HIGHER, FARTHER: THE
VOLKSWAGEN SCANDAL 57 (2017); Nicola Faith Sharpe, Volkswagen’s Bad Decisions
& Harmful Emissions: How Poor Process Corrupted Codetermination in Germany’s
Dual Board Structure, 7 MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 49, 62 (2017); Peer
Zumbansen & Daniel Saam, The ECJ, Volkswagen and European Corporate Law:
Reshaping the European Varieties of Capitalism, 8 GERMAN L.J. 1027 (2007).
68
Kuntz, supra note 62, at 233.
69
See Andreas Rühmkorf, Felix Spindler & Navajyoti Samanta, Evolution of German
corporate governance (1995-2014): an empirical analysis, 19 CORP. GOV. 1042
(2019).
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little more than passing attention from corporate governance scholars.70 It is
rarely given the kind of in-depth treatment that a fully functioning, alternative
model of corporate governance would seem to demand.71 Instead, corporate law
scholars in American have spent much of the last fifty years focused on
shareholder primacy.
A. The Hegemony of Shareholder Primacy
Shareholder primacy has been the dominant corporate governance model in
the United States for decades. The basic corporate structure—where
shareholders elect the directors, who in turn select the officers to run the
corporation—replicates itself in corporations from every state. While there are
some variations in governance structures, both among actual corporations and
in the guise of potential reforms, this corporate form has remained relatively
stable over the last century. Its critical governance feature—who gets to vote,
about what, and under what circumstances—has also been fixed: the corporate
franchise belongs to shareholders and shareholders alone. And shareholder
governance is not limited to board elections. Shareholders have voting rights to
amend the corporation’s charter as well as its bylaws,72 and transformative
corporate decisions—such as mergers, certain acquisitions, and dissolution (the
end of the corporation)—also require shareholder approval.73 From start to
finish, shareholders call the shots in American corporate law.
70

See, e.g., CORPORATE LAW AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 295-96 (Lucian Arye
Bebchuck ed., 1990) (one passing reference to codetermination); FRANK H.
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE
LAW 69 (1991) (again, one passing reference to codetermination); HENRY HANSMANN,
THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 110-112 (1996) (a few pages); STEPHEN M.
BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 47-49
(2008) (a few pages, though he wrote a couple of earlier articles on what he called
“participatory management”); JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN 230 (2008) (some passing references to the
German system).
71
One refreshing exception is EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 163-235
(Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe eds., 1999).
72
Generally, the board of directors must first propose an amendment to the charter, and
then the shareholders must approve the amendment. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
§ 10.03 (2016). In Delaware, the amendment must be approved by a majority of all
shares outstanding, rather than just a majority of shares voting. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 242(b)(1) (2019).
73
WILLIAM A. KLEIN, ET AL., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 222-25 (11th
ed. 2010) (describing different types of mergers and acquisitions).
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Over time, scholars have developed an intellectual framework in support of
this central role that shareholders play in corporate governance. As they
developed the framework, the role of shareholders within the corporation
evolved from that of absentee landlords to the focus of the entire enterprise. The
resulting theory of shareholder primacy redesigned the purpose and function of
the corporation to revolve around shareholder wealth maximization.74 And the
shareholder primacy norm, a familiar notion even to nonlawyers, now has wide
acceptance in both theory and practice.
The main scholarly justifications for the central control feature of
shareholder primacy—the exclusive shareholder franchise—were generated in
the latter part of the twentieth century. One model describes the corporation as
a nexus of freely bargained contracts among all corporate constituents, and
therefore presumptively the most efficient way to structure firm governance.75
Another argument is that shareholders are owners of the corporate residual, and
they have the appropriate incentives to make good firm decisions.76 Rights to
the residual provide shareholders with a common interest in maximizing
corporate profits, which reduces their tendency to squabble about firm decisions
and thus promotes efficiency. This homogeneous interest in profits also
eliminates the possibility of destructive voting cycles, à la Arrow’s theorem.77
We have routinely questioned these traditional arguments for the
shareholder franchise. The nexus of contracts model of the corporation is an
entirely fictitious account of the corporation and its constituents, and tells us
74

Matthew T. Bodie, AOL Time Warner and the False God of Shareholder Primacy,
31 J. CORP. L. 975, 977 (2006) (“This [shareholder primacy] norm is much more than
a descriptive account of shareholders’ rights; it is instead a normative judgment on the
most socially efficient way of organizing the economy.”).
75
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA
L. REV. 1, 9 (2002) (“The dominant model of the corporation in legal scholarship is the
so-called nexus of contracts theory.”); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The
Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1418 (1989) (“The corporation is a
complex set of explicit and implicit contracts, and corporate law enables the participants
to select the optimal arrangement for the many different sets of risks and opportunities
that are available in a large economy.”).
76
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 67-68 (1991) (justifying the corporate franchise based on
shareholders’ interests in the residual).
77
See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 395, 405 (1983) (discussing KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND
INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963)).
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very little about the choices that actual shareholders and other corporate
constituents would make in the absence of various constraints. 78 The argument
based on the residual is undercut by the growing realization that shareholders do
not have a common interest in wealth maximization, but instead have interests
that diverge along a number of dimensions.79 As a result, scholars are losing
trust in shareholders with significant power,80 and there is even support for
nonvoting shares and passive shareholding.81 Those who support strengthened
shareholder power are even accused of supporting special interests and shadow

78

See Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Shareholder Voting and the Symbolic
Politics of Corporation as Contract, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 511 (2018).
79
See Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate
Law and Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 767, 791 (2017) (describing “several
sources of conflict among shareholders, including differing investment horizons and
needs for cash payouts, empty voting, and competing outside interests”); Grant M.
Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, One Share, One Vote and the False Promise of
Shareholder Homogeneity, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 445, 477-98 (2008); Iman Anabtawi,
Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561, 574-92
(2006).
80
Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN.
L. REV. 1255, 1258 (2008) (“[A]ctivist shareholders are using their growing influence
not to improve overall firm performance, as has generally been assumed, but to profit
at other shareholders’ expense.”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and
Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1750 (2006) (“[S]hareholder
voting is properly understood not as a primary component of the corporate
decisionmaking structure, but rather as an accountability device of last resort, to be used
sparingly, at most.”).
81
Dorothy S. Lund, Nonvoting Shares and Efficient Corporate Governance, 71 STAN.
L. REV. 687, 697-98 (2019); Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder
Voting, 43 J. CORP. L. 493, 497 (2018) (arguing that passive funds should not have
voting rights).
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agendas.82 And the argument based on Arrow’s theorem, with its prediction of
firm-destroying voting cycles, was nonsensical from the very beginning.83
So while it may seem an ideal time to examine alternatives to the traditional
model, competing corporate law theories have not filled this gap. Board primacy
theories may do a better job describing the actual relationship between
shareholders and the board of directors,84 or better take into account the many
participants in the life of a corporation,85 but they fall back upon the traditional
arguments to support the retention of the exclusive shareholder franchise.86
Stakeholder theories propose that corporate governance should take all
stakeholder into account,87 but they lack a model for allocating governance

82

See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 80, at 1754 (claiming that Lucian Bebchuk’s
argument for shareholder empowerment would help “precisely the institutions most
likely to use their position to self-deal—that is, to take a non-pro rata share of the firm’s
assets and earnings—or otherwise to reap private benefits not shared with other
investors”); Hon. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A
Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114
COLUM. L. REV. 449, 451 (2014) (“Bebchuk is the sincere champion of one group of
‘agents’ wielding power and authority over others’ money—the money managers who
control most of the investments belonging ultimately to ordinary Americans who are
saving to pay for their retirements and for their children’s education—against another
group of ‘agents’ that he believes is somehow more conflicted--the agents who actually
manage corporations that make real products and deliver useful services (i.e.
‘productive corporations’).”).
83
See Grant Hayden & Matthew Bodie, Arrow’s Theorem and the Exclusive
Shareholder Franchise, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1219 (2009).
84
See generally STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE (2008).
85
See generally Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999).
86
For an overview and critical evaluation of the various forms of board primacy theory,
see Grant Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Shareholder Democracy and the Curious Turn
Toward Board Primacy, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2071 (2010).
87
See David Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Law: Foundations and Law
Reform Strategies, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 1, 11-12 (Lawrence E. Mitchell
ed., 1995) (discussing efforts to provide protections to nonshareholder constituencies);
Blair & Stout, supra note 85, at 293-94 (arguing that directors owe a duty to the
corporation and that the corporation consists of all of the stakeholders who are
responsible for the business of the enterprise).
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rights and responsibilities among the participants.88 Shareholder primacy still
reigns supreme in corporate governance theory.
The triumph of shareholder primacy seemed so complete that it prompted
Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman to declare the end of corporate law
history. “There is no longer any serious competitor,” they claimed, “to the view
that corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder
value.”89 And, to this day, shareholder primacy remains the dominant model of
corporate governance in the United States, and certainly retains a hammerlock
on corporate legal scholarship. It remains an unspoken, seemingly self-evident
truth about corporations.
B. Codetermination in American Legal Scholarship
The deep commitment that American legal scholars have for shareholder
primacy has obvious implications for their views of codetermination. Arguments
in favor of the exclusive shareholder franchise are necessarily arguments against
any system of shared governance. So, in a sense, the scholarly community’s
assessment of German codetermination lurks beneath the surface of these
broader commitments. And given the stranglehold that shareholder primacy has
over American legal scholarship, that assessment, though rarely explored at any
length, is largely a negative one.
With very few exceptions, corporate law scholars tend to focus on one
particular aspect of the German system of codetermination: the fact that it is
mandated by law. That, coupled with the absence of corporate boards with
employee representatives in the United States, is viewed by the scholars as proof
positive that their theoretical arguments for shareholder primacy—and, more
specifically, for the exclusive shareholder franchise—are on the money.
Their argument here is a variant of the contractarian argument for the
exclusive shareholder franchise. This version is as follows: if codetermination
is so great, then firms would voluntarily adopt it. But American firms have not
88

See Eric W. Orts & Alan Strudler, Putting a Stake in Stakeholder Theory, 88 J. BUS.
ETHICS 605, 611 (2009) (arguing that stakeholder theory fails to provide a system of
mechanisms for governance, other than “balancing” stakeholder concerns); Joseph
Heath, Business Ethics Without Stakeholders, 16 BUS. ETHICS Q. 533, 543 (2006)
(arguing that stakeholder theory creates “extraordinary agency risks” because of the
potential for conflicts).
89
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89
GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001).
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done so. Codetermination, therefore, is not that great and, in fact, is less efficient
than the method of governance chosen in the United States, with corporate
boards elected by shareholders alone. In fact, the only way a firm would end up
with employee representation on its board is if you mandate it, as Germany does
by law. In short, nobody freely chooses codetermination, thus it is less efficient
than having shareholders run the show.
A wide range of legal scholars have made versions of this argument that
codetermination must be inefficient because it has not been voluntarily adopted
by firms.90 Stephen Bainbridge, for example, has made a number of arguments
against shared governance.91 Those more general arguments—which largely
spring from his views about the corporation as a nexus of contracts, his
application of Kenneth Arrow’s distinction between consensus and authority
decisionmaking, and his reasons for advancing board primacy—have been
critiqued elsewhere.92 More specifically, though, Bainbridge notes that
voluntary adoption of codetermination is “very rare.”93 Instead, shared
governance is usually adopted by national legislation. The German system, for
example, was created by “sweeping statutory mandates.”94 For Bainbridge, this
lack of voluntary adoption reinforces his other arguments against shared
governance, for “[in] the absence of any documented market failure, it is fair to
infer from this evidence that codetermination is less efficient than the AngloAmerican tradition of excluding workers from board representation.”95

90

This argument in broader theoretical context is also discussed in ADDISON, supra
note 55, at 104-08.
91
See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Privately Ordered Participatory Management: An
Organizational Failures Analysis, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 979, 1054-55 (1998) [hereinafter
Bainbridge, Privately Ordered Participatory Management]; Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Participatory Management Within a Theory of the Firm, 21 J. CORP. L. 657 (1996).
92
See, e.g., Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Shareholder Voting and the
Symbolic Politics of Corporation as Contract, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 511, 530-46
(2018) (critiquing the nexus of contracts view of corporations); Brett H. McDonnell,
Professor Bainbridge and the Arrowian Moment: A Review of The New Corporate
Governance in Theory and Practice, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 139, 143 (2009) (critiquing his
applications of Arrow’s views on consensus and authority in decisionmaking); Hayden
& Bodie, supra note 86 (critiquing the relationship between the arguments for board
primacy and those for the exclusive shareholder franchise).
93
Bainbridge, Privately Ordered Participatory Management, supra note 91, at 1054.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 1054-55.
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George Dent makes a similar argument with respect to the broader concept
of stakeholder representation (though he mostly focuses on employees).96 As he
explains, “Apart from economic theory, there is another and perhaps more
telling problem with the stakeholder concept: If stakeholder governance can
produce a bigger pie, and a larger piece for each constituency, why has it not
happened through private arrangements?”97 He likens the absence of shared
governance systems to “the dog that did not bark” in the Silver Blaze, a story in
which Sherlock Holmes solves a crime by noting that a dog’s silence shows than
the intruder was an insider. For Dent, there are few voluntarily adopted systems
of codetermination—the dogs are not barking—and that tells us something
important about the purported benefits of such a system.
Roberto Romano approaches the issue in a similar fashion, though expands
her list of silent dogs to include state governments.98 “It is questionable,” she
says, “whether such worker representation provisions enhance shareholder
value. If they did, one would expect U.S. states and firms to opt for such
arrangements . . . .”99 In other words, market forces would lead both
corporations and state governments to adopt shared governance were it
perceived to increase share value. And to top it off, she adds that though the
German codetermination model is available in France, almost no French firms
have adopted it.100
Henry Hansmann and Renier Kraakman make a similar point. 101 After
discussing a range of potential advantages to employee representation, they
(along with coauthors Luca Enriques and Mariana Pargendler) nevertheless end
with these questions: “if large efficiencies result from codetermination, why do
the parties fail to contract for labor directors voluntarily and divide the surplus?
Why do we seldom see labor directors where they are not mandated by law?”102
96

See George W. Dent, Jr., Stakeholder Governance: A Bad Idea Getting Worse, 58
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1107, 1115-16 (2008).
97
Id. at 1115. This particular argument elides the possibility that codetermination might
produce a bigger overall pie without producing a larger piece for every constituency.
98
See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 129-30
(1993).
99
Id. at 130.
100
See id.
101
See Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann, Renier Kraakman & Mariana Pargendler, The
Basic Governance Structure: Minority Shareholders and Non-Shareholder
Constituencies, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 79, 106 (John Armour et al. eds., 3d ed. 2017); see also
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 89, at 445.
102
Enriques et al., supra note 101, at 106.
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While there may be cultural explanations, the authors note that “a competing
explanation is that the costs of labor representation exceed its benefits, or at least
are feared to do so.”103 Elsewhere, Hansmann and Kraakman note, “The growing
view today is that meaningful direct worker voting participation in corporate
affairs tends to produce inefficient decisions, paralysis, or weak boards, and that
these costs are likely to exceed any potential benefits that worker participation
might bring.”104
So this argument has been made by Bainbridge, Dent, Romano, Hansmann,
and Kraakman in the 1990s through the early 2000s. But it may have been first
(and in any case, most forcefully) made by Michael Jensen and William
Meckling in the late 1970s.105 “Without fiat,” they flatly claimed,
“codetermination would be virtually nonexistent.”106 They then backed up this
argument with a prediction: German codetermination would soon devolve into
a system in which either shareholders or employees had complete control. 107 If
the former, then codetermination would just go away, and be replaced by the
shareholder control that dominates the landscape in the United States.108 If,
however, employees succeed in controlling firms, then the Germany economy
would grind to a halt like Tito’s Yugoslavia, with “fairly complete, if not total,
state ownership of the productive assets in the economy.”109
Some forty years later, Jensen and Meckling’s prediction looks laughable.
German codetermination remains in place and, as we shall soon see, is an
important aspect of its robust economy. More recently Jens Dammann and Horst
Eidenmüller have taken a different tack: they argue that while codetermination
might work in Germany, it is a “poor fit” with the United States.110 They argue
that certain aspects of the German economy—such as robust unions, protections
against unjust terminations, and a slower market for corporate control—make
codetermination work better there than it would in America. Thus, even
103

Id.
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 89, at 445.
105
See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Rights and Production Functions:
An Application to Labor-Managed Firms and Codetermination, 52 J. BUS. 469, 47375, 503-04 (1979).
106
Id. at 473.
107
See id. at 503.
108
See id.
109
Id. at 504.
110
Jens Dammann and Horst Eidenmüller, Codetermination: A Poor Fit for U.S.
Corporations,
Working
Paper,
April
9,
2020,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3565955.
104
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conceding that “mandatory codetermination may well be an efficient choice for
German firms, there are compelling reasons to believe that its adoption would
be less desirable for the United States.”111
C. Shortcomings in Codetermination Scholarship
There are a number of shortcomings in the way in which American
corporate law scholars use German codetermination to make their case for
shareholder voting. Initially, their arguments are based on a flawed
understanding of how German codetermination actually came into existence. In
addition, they largely overlook the many possible reasons individual firms might
not voluntarily adopt a system of employee representation despite the fact that
it may lead to overall welfare gains (and perhaps even gains to shareholders
themselves). Finally, U.S. scholars have yet to engage in the real debate over
codetermination: the question of shareholder versus employee power.
1.

The Origins of German Codetermination

The theoretical arguments for the exclusive shareholder franchise have
always been vulnerable to a factual rebuttal. This is especially true because many
of the arguments trade on the disasters that would allegedly befall firms that
deviate from the model of shareholder control. One solid counterexample of a
firm that involved shared governance—and held its own, or even thrived, in the
marketplace—should be enough to undercut even the most elaborate theoretical
justification. The recent performance of the German economy (indeed, its
continued existence) not only makes mockery of Jensen and Meckling’s specific
prediction, but more generally undermines the arguments for the exclusive
shareholder franchise. And for that reason, we will look at the empirical research
evaluating German codetermination in Part IV.
Here, though, we focus on the more specific claim that codetermination
must be inefficient because nobody voluntarily agrees to such a system of
corporate governance; it must, instead, be mandated. But it turns out that this
position, too, may be subject to empirical rebuttal. And, in fact, a key assumption
underlying the claim—that codetermination can only arise through fiat, not
voluntary agreement—has itself been revealed to be false.
Ewan McGaughey, a U.K. legal historian and economist, recently showed
that German codetermination first arose through collective agreements and only
111

Id. at 49.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3684690

26

Law Review

[Vol. 100

later was enacted into law.112 Codetermination arrived at the end of World War
I, “not as a law, not as a regulation, but as an agreement.”113 Only afterward did
supervisory codetermination get codified into legislation.114 Codetermination
was then abolished by the Nazi Regime with a 1934 statute,115 only to be
recreated—again though agreement—at the conclusion of World War II.116
The basic sequence was that codetermination arose through consensual
agreement, developed into social consensus, and later became embodied in the
law.117 This history shows that the law and economics scholars are not just
wrong on this point, but may have the picture completely upside down:
codetermination was created by agreement not once but twice, while the law was
sometimes used to quash it.118 So if codetermination arose through voluntary
agreement in Germany, why didn’t the same bargain get struck everywhere else?
What was so special about Germany? McGaughey identifies two, relatively rare
“Goldilocks” conditions that existed in postwar Germany: first, employers and
employees had relatively equal bargaining power, and, second, the labor
movement was unified around a common objective of securing meaningful
representation at work.119 These two conditions made the codetermination
bargain possible.
Now, it might be argued that the historical rarity of these Goldilocks
conditions makes the German example unique, ingermane to the more typical
bargains struck by labor and capital. But a closer look at those conditions shows
that, if anything, the opposite is true. Remember, the contractarian argument
draws its normative force from the assumption that freely bargained for
agreements better reflect the preferences of the parties.120 All things being equal,
they reflect the most efficient outcome. But in order for this to work, the parties
must actually be free to bargain. That freedom may be limited if the parties are
in unequal bargaining positions (making it less likely that the weaker party is
112

See Ewan McGaughey, The Codetermination Bargains: The History of German
Corporate and Labor Law, 23 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 135 (2016).
113
Id. at 155.
114
See id. at 157.
115
See id. at 162.
116
See id. at 163-67.
117
See id. at 174.
118
See id. at 170.
119
See id. at 136-37, 155-56, 168.
120
See Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Shareholder Voting and the Symbolic
Politics of Corporation as Contract, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 511, 531, 533, 541-42
(2018).
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really getting what it wants), one group of constituents has coordination
problems (again, reducing their bargaining power), or there are legal or logistical
roadblocks to certain kinds of agreements. The contractarian argument for the
exclusive shareholder franchise fails to account for all three of these issues:
employees have never had equal bargaining power; U.S. labor unions have never
represented more than one-third of private-sector employees, and currently
represent less than 7 percent; and both legal and logistical roadblocks make it
difficult for American unions to participate in corporate governance.121
The Goldilocks conditions, in other words, do not reflect the conditions that
surround the formation of U.S. corporations, but they do reflect the kind of rare
situation that gets the contractarian arguments up and running and gives them
their normative force. Corporate constituents in the presence of those conditions
do not, however, hand over all governance authority to shareholders. They
instead put both shareholder and employee representatives on the board. Like
the argument from Arrow’s theorem—where we learned that the presence of an
oppositional electorate actually decreases the chance of a voting cycle122—the
contractarian argument, if anything, ends up militating in favor of employee
representation. When corporate stakeholders have relatively equal bargaining
power and are free of internal coordination problems, they bargain for
codetermination.
2.

The Limitations of Private Ordering

The primary theoretical argument against adoption of codetermination
within the United States has been its failure to naturally catch on at individual
companies. Under U.S. market settings, there are a number of reasons why
codetermination may not be voluntarily introduced even if it increases overall

121

For discussions of the legal impediments to systems of worker participation, see
Matthew T. Bodie, Holacracy and the Law, 42 DEL. J. CORP. L. 619, 662-71 (2018);
Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Labor Law Obstacles to the Collective Negotiation and
Implementation of Employee Stock Ownership Plans: A Response to Henry Hansmann
and Other “Survivalists,” 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 957 (1998). Dammann and
Eidenmüller argue that the low rate of unionization within the U.S. is actually a reason
not to adopt codetermination, because employees will not be in as good a position to
take advantage of the board seats. Dammann and Eidenmüller, supra note 110, at 2324.
122
See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 83, at 1238.
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utility. First, allocation and distribution are not separated.123 Employees with
governance rights may engage in rent-seeking in ways that reduce profits; even
if codetermination increases overall welfare, shareholders may not go for it
because it wouldn’t advance their own interests.124 This, of course, would
happen whether or not shareholders would actually lose out under a system of
shared governance—so long as they believe they’ll lose out, they won’t agree to
such a system.
Second, there may be information asymmetries that prevent a company
from voluntarily introducing codetermination.125 The introduction of a new
system of shared governance might, for example, send a false signal to the
market that there’s some problem with the firm’s labor-management relations
that needs fixing. That signal could affect the company’s ability to raise funds,
putting them at a unique disadvantage.126
Third, collective action problems may prevent individual firms from
adopting a system of shared governance. David Levine and Laura Tyson have
argued that codetermination needs to be adopted on a broad scale because
individual firms find themselves in a prisoners’ dilemma with regard to their
existing entitlements and constituents.127 Unilateral adoption of codetermination
may lead to wage compression (resulting in the loss of managerial and executive
employees) and dismissal protections (resulting in the retention of poorly
performing employees), disadvantaging the adopting firm in relation to its
competitors for capital and sales.128
Finally, there are additional reasons to think that the bargain for employee
representation may not be struck by individual corporations—namely, the pathdependency and network effects of the widespread adoption of a particular
system of governance. Current systems of both corporate law and ownership
structures are embedded in existing businesses and may prove resistant to

123

See Simon Renaud, Dynamic Efficiency of Supervisory Board Codetermination in
Germany, 21 LABOUR 689, 691 (2007).
124
See id.
125
See id.
126
See id. at 691-92.
127
See David I. Levine & Laura D. Tyson, Participation, Productivity, and the Firm’s
Environment, in PAYING FOR PRODUCTIVITY: A LOOK AT THE EVIDENCE 183 (Alan S.
Blinder, ed. 1990).
128
See id. at 214-19.
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change.129 Moreover, participants in the system grow accustomed to particular
methods and models and must absorb transaction costs if these change. 130 The
depth and consistency of Delaware corporate law as developed over time has
been cited as a factor in the small state’s success on the corporate law market,
making it costly to incorporate elsewhere.131 The state’s solicitude towards
managers and shareholders doesn’t hurt, either.132
Without some kind of industry-wide (or economy-wide) agreement, these
information asymmetries and collective action problems mean that the boards of
individual firms—which are at that point still governed solely by shareholders—
will rationally fail to adopt the approach that would have the greater utility
overall.133 The industry-wide bargaining that took place in post-war Germany
129

See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in
Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 129 (1999) (describing
how “initial ownership structures” can affect both “subsequent ownership structures”
(“structure-driven path dependence”) and “subsequent structures through their effect on
the legal rules governing corporations” (“rule-driven path dependence”)); Eric Engle &
Tetiana Danyliuk, Emulating the German Two-Tier Board and Worker Participation in
U.S. Law: A Stakeholder Theory of the Firm, 45 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 69, 110
(2015) (noting the role of path dependence).
130
Cf. Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1549, 1567 (1989) (discussing the externalities introduced by the use of nonstandard corporate forms). But cf. Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A
Political and Economic Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 544 (1990) (developing the
“triviality hypothesis” that, “appearances notwithstanding, state corporate law is trivial:
it does not prevent companies—managers and investors together—from establishing
any set of governance rules they want”).
131
See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in
Corporate Contracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 723
(1997) (“Most broadly, the use of generally accepted accounting principles as a baseline
convention for bond covenants and the choice of Delaware as a state of incorporation
facilitate obtaining high quality accounting and legal advice, respectively.”); Leo E.
Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and Some of the New
Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 683 (2005) (“ . . . Delaware
chancellors and supreme court justices devote a considerable amount of time to
fashioning sensible, fair corporate law decisions in a timely way.”).
132
See Strine, supra note 131, at 680 (“. . . [C]orporation law in Delaware is influenced
by only the two constituencies whose views are most important in determining where
entities incorporate: managers and stockholders.”).
133
See id. at 214. Under the prisoner’s dilemma framework, individual players make
less-than-optimal choices because of the interdependency of outcomes and the inability
to trust their partner/opponent.
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involved exactly the kind of cooperation needed to lift corporate players out of
these situations. But it’s unlikely that such conditions will naturally arise in the
American economy any time soon.
3.

The Battle for Corporate Power

Because American corporate law scholarship has not really taken
codetermination seriously, it has not joined the true conflict at the heart of the
debate: the struggle between shareholders and employees—between capital and
labor—for power. The U.S. system is premised on the idea that total shareholder
control will keep labor in check and spur management to get the highest returns
possible for equity holders. By labeling employees with all other stakeholders
as “fixed” claimants, shareholder primacy can categorize an increase in
shareholder returns as an overall increase in efficiency, rather than a claim to a
large share of the pie. But as corporate profits and share prices have ratcheted
upwards, and workers’ wages have remained stagnant, the effects of shareholder
primacy can be keenly felt. Shareholders run the game, and they use their power
to increase their gains.
Codetermination breaks this shareholder vise-grip on corporate control. It
empowers employees by giving them a voice and a role within the governance
of the firm. As a result, shareholders are likely to see their power within the
corporation diminish. But this is a feature, not a bug. There are larger empirical
questions about which system works best that can be measured in different ways:
equity prices, wages, Tobin’s Q, gross domestic product, environmental harm,
or return to creditors. As we will discuss in Part IV, codetermination has scored
solidly under these measures, and has held up even more strongly in the wake
of recent crises. But the ideological questions of shareholder and worker power
are a critical part of the debate—and one that law and economics research has
largely ignored.
In their recent working paper, Dammann and Eidenmüller work within the
traditional law and economics framework in arguing against the adoption of
codetermination on U.S. soil.134 But rather than a mounting a full-throated
defense of shareholder primacy, they characterize codetermination as a fine
proposition for Germans but unavailing here. They do not, for example, outright
argue that having worker representatives on the board will distract from
shareholder wealth maximization; instead, the problem is having two conflicting
134

Dammann and Eidenmüller, supra note 110.
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sets of goals that will confuse matters.135 At times, their arguments seem selfdefeating. For example, they minimize codetermination’s usefulness to workers
by pointing out the ways in which U.S. workers are comparatively powerless; as
such, they would not be able to use board representation as effectively as
German workers can.136 The relative powerlessness of workers, on this view,
becomes reason to retain the core feature of the governance structure that
disempowers them to begin with. Elsewhere, they downplay the non-pecuniary
benefits of codetermination, such as providing dignity to workers and
strengthening economic democracy, by maintaining that the main concern of
employees “is not being treated in a de-humanizing fashion at their workplace
in a large corporation. Rather, it is losing their job completely or being moved
into the precarious position of a (seemingly) independent contractor in the gig
economy.”137 It doesn’t even seem to register that there might be a relationship
between these two concerns.138
135

Id. at 26-28. Dammann and Eidenmüller admit that there’s quite a bit of evidence
that more diverse boards improve corporate decision-making, but then assert—without
evidence—that this is true only when boards members have the same goals. Id. at 26.
Of course, board members are diverse precisely because they do not entirely agree with
each other, even with respect to corporate goals, and shareholders themselves do not
have homogeneous preferences with regard to corporate goals. See Grant M. Hayden &
Matthew T. Bodie, The False Promise of One Share, One Vote, 30 CARDOZO L. REV.
445 (2008). And as we will see in the next section, German supervisory board members
are required by law to put the interest of the corporation above those of their
constituents, and there is quite a bit of evidence that supervisory board meetings are
marked by a great degree of cooperation between shareholder and employee
representatives. See infra Part IV. The authors completely overlook this evidence, and
instead emphasize the importance of board collegiality by trying to analogize the
situation to the corporate boards that might be produced by cumulative voting, which,
according to one 1955 article, detrimentally affected collegiality (despite the fact that
majority and minority shareholders supposedly shared a common goal of maximizing
shareholder wealth). See Damman & Eidenmüller, supra note 110, at 27-28.
136
Id. at 20-23.
137
Id. at 24.
138
And as for strengthening economic democracy, the authors maintain that democracy
is already strong enough in the United States, a fact they find support for in the sheer
number of elected offices, including even judges. With such proliferation of elections,
they argue, Americans don’t really need any more opportunities to cast a ballot. See id.
at 25. But the strength of an economic democracy isn’t measured by the number of
elective offices or the number of votes cast, but by whether citizens meaningfully
participate in a way that provides “social constraints over the use of capital.” Id. at 23
(quoting Katharina Pistor, Codetermination: A Sociopolitical Model with Governance
Externalities, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 9, at 167).
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In terms of the downsides of codetermination, Dammann and Eidenmüller
focus on the role of employees in confronting corporate risk. Based on the
different incentives between shareholders and workers, they argue, companies
run by diversified capitalists have been and should remain more willing to take
risks than companies with significant labor involvement. Codetermination
discourages risk-taking, and “extreme risk-taking” is an American specialty.139
This argument, of course, assumes that there’s an optimal level of risk-taking;
that the United States happens to be at that optimal point; and that shareholders
are in the best position to assess the potential downsides of risky corporate
behavior with respect to all corporate constituents. These are all dubious
propositions. They present the fact that American firms are significantly more
likely to undergo bankruptcy than their German counterparts somehow as a
positive development.140 Dammann and Eidenmüller also believe that the U.S.
bankruptcy system will interact poorly with codetermination.141 Unlike the
German system—where an insolvency administrator does most of the work—
the U.S. generally relies on creditor governance with the debtor-in-possession
running the show. Greater levels of employee input might slow down this
system, since the debtor’s decision-making process on the restructuring plan
“would be fraught with difficult discussions between shareholder and employee
representatives.”142 This concern, if truly problematic, could be resolved through
changes to the bankruptcy law—a possibility Dammann and Eidenmüller
overlook.
We do not pretend to claim that there are not economic arguments in favor
of the current U.S. system. But the academic debate about the superiority of
shareholder primacy versus codetermination has not really been joined. The
strategy of law and economics scholars to this point has been primarily to ignore,
belittle, or sequester codetermination as a practice that does not deserve real
One of the principal criticisms of our system of democracy is that politicians are
beholden to corporate interests, and corporations are not looking out for their
employees.
139
Damman & Eidenmüller, supra note 110, at 41-44.
140
Id. at 43 (“Employee representatives who are seeking to get reelected will hardly
want to jeopardize their prospects by agreeing to investments that workers oppose.
Thus, employee representatives will generally try to prevent corporate boards from
‘betting the farm.’ Empirical evidence is consistent with this narrative. Thus, it has been
shown that firms in the United States on average face a higher probably of bankruptcy
than firms in stakeholder countries such as Germany.”).
141
See id. at 31-32.
142
Id. at 32.
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examination. We believe differently and hope that this treatment will inspire
American academics to take another, deeper look.
IV. CODETERMINATION IN PRACTICE
So how well has codetermination worked in Germany? Much of the
scholarship evaluating the system has centered on its role in promoting broader
goals such as social cohesion and fairness.143 The bottom-line, economic effects
of codetermination (which we’ll turn to shortly) are either seen as secondary or
as necessarily following from the achievement of these societal goals.144 That is,
codetermination is viewed less in terms of an economic system than as one
designed to promote a well-functioning democracy and help prevent social
division—in particular, the division between labor and capital. And, on this
broad level, it is thought to be quite successful.
The success of codetermination on the social level has carried over to the
boardroom, where the relationship between labor and capital is relatively
harmonious.145 Shareholder and employee representatives typically meet
separately with the managing board before coming together at the supervisory
board meetings.146 These pre-meetings allow representatives to focus on the
interests of their constituents and raise concerns with the management boards.147
Recent studies have revealed that the supervisory meetings themselves are
marked by a great deal of cooperation between shareholder and employee
representatives.148 This cooperation may be fostered in part by the legal
requirement that shareholder and employee representatives must, at that point,
put the interest of the corporation over those of their respective constituents.149
While the relationships at the supervisory board level are not perfect, they are a
far cry from the law-and-economics predictions of firm-destroying voting cycles
and other visions of inter-board squabbling and dysfunction.
A. Codetermination and Economic Performance

143

See ADDISON, supra note 55, at 2.
See id.
145
See Sandrock, supra note 61, at 131.
146
See du Plessis & Saenger, supra note 64, at 49.
147
See id.
148
See Sandrock & du Plessis, supra note 53, at 186.
149
See id. at 184; du Plessis & Saenger, General Meeting, supra note 59, at 66.
144
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There are a limited number of studies that evaluate the actual effects of
codetermination on firm behavior and economic success. And most of those
studies focus on a relatively narrow set of outcomes associated with shareholder
interests. Robert Scholz and Sigurt Vitols recently cataloged the 37 extant
studies on the relationship between codetermination and firm performance and
found that 14 of them focused on stock market performance and 13 on
profitability.150 Seven studies analyzed codetermination’s impact on
productivity, which would be of interest to both shareholders and employees
(and, more broadly, society).151 Very few studies analyzed issues that would
seem to be most important to employees, such as wages, employment levels, and
job security.152
This evaluative approach is odd and continues to infect most discussions of
codetermination. One would expect that, all things being equal, a shift from full
shareholder control to partial shareholder control would decrease the gains
allocated to shareholders. Employees can, in various ways, allocate a greater
proportion of the returns to joint production to themselves if they have
governance power. These distributional shifts would leave shareholders with
less of the pie, even if overall the firm had the same or greater gains.
In any case, we should not be misled into thinking that the effect of
codetermination on shareholders alone tells us its effect on the firm, broadly
construed to include all corporate constituents. This lack of identity between
shareholder interests and firm interests seems obvious, and raises the question
of why so many studies appear to assume they are one and the same thing.
Prominent academics have critiqued this focus on shareholder wealth
maximization even in the context of U.S. companies.153 A comprehensive
150

See Scholz & Vitols, supra note 52, at 235 tbl.1. The overall numbers add up to more
than 37 because some studies had multiple subjects, but the overall skew toward
shareholder interests is still clear, with only 5 studies involving wages and not a single
study analyzing the effect of codetermination on any measures of corporate social
responsibility.
151
See id.
152
See id. at 235.
153
Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder
Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 639-40 (2006) (“Indeed, most studies do not expressly
consider the implications of using shareholder wealth as a measure of firm value,
despite the fact that they purport to be conducting a general efficiency analysis in which
the primary goal should be maximizing the size of the corporate surplus, while
considerations of the appropriate division of the corporate surplus should be
secondary.”). See also Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Companies Should Maximize
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assessment of codetermination must include its impact on all corporate
constituents.
What this means is that many studies we’re about to discuss necessarily
render an incomplete picture of codetermination, one that largely focuses on the
success of the firm as measured by stock price or profits. This puts us in a curious
position when trying to make a broader assessment. If these studies show that
shareholders come out behind, we still need to ask whether their losses are
counterbalanced or even outweighed by gains to other constituents. If, on the
other hand, shareholders fortunes are unaffected by codetermination, or they
even come out ahead, then we can be pretty confident that the German system
of shared governance delivers across the board.154
A number of studies have assessed the economic effects of codetermination,
with a consensus that has shifted back and forth over the last four decades.155
Some early studies from the 1980s found that codetermination had very little
impact on corporate performance.156 Those studies, however, were criticized on
Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value, 2 J.L. FIN. & ACCT. 247, 248 (2017)
(discussing the difference between shareholder utility maximization and shareholder
wealth maximization).
154
Making a similar point on the range of possibilities, John Addison explains, “Worker
representation on company boards arouses strong feelings. At one extreme it is viewed
as tantamount to wealth confiscation with palpably adverse consequences for firm
performance. At another, it is viewed as helping guarantee cooperative labor relations,
with long term gains in terms of productivity and improved worker morale. Intermediate
positions would recognize the joint occurrence of allocative and distributive effects,
permitting either increases of decrease in overall welfare . . . .” ADDISON, supra note
55, at 119. On this question of economic performance, we take the intermediate
position.
155
For the best summary of the literature through 2008 and a discussion of the three
initial phases of research detailed below, see ADDISON, supra note 55, at 108-121; see
also Uwe Jirjahn, Ökonomische Wirkungen der Mitbestimmung in Deutschland: Ein
Update, ARBEITSPAPIER 186, Düsseldorf: Hans-Böckler-Stiftung (Feb. 2010).
156
See, e.g., Jan Svejnar, Relative Wage Effects of Unions, Dictatorship, and Codetermination: Econometric Evidence from Germany, 63 REV. ECON. & STATS. 188
(1981) (finding codetermination associated with higher earnings in the iron and steel
industry but not in the coal mining industry); Guiseppe Benelli et al., Labor
Participation in Corporate Policy-Making Decisions: West Germany’s Experience with
Codetermination, 60 J. BUS. 553 (1987) (finding no real differences between firms with
codetermination and without codetermination across a variety of measures of
performance); Michael A. Gurdon & Anoop Rai, Codetermination and Enterprise
Performance: Empirical Evidence from West Germany, 42 J. ECON. & BUS. 289 (1990)
(finding codetermination led to higher profitability but lower productivity).
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a number of methodological grounds,157 and several more sophisticated
evaluations in the 1990s and early 2000s gave a more pessimistic account,
finding that codetermination was associated with, among other things, lower
productivity and lower profits.158 That consensus, though, soon gave way to a
third phase in the literature, one that both reversed the principal findings of the
second-phase studies (finding them to be artifacts of a particular method of
assessment)159 and found that codetermination was also modestly associated
with greater innovation.160 These more optimistic assessments were bolstered by
a couple of modern financial studies on the market value of the firm, which
found that “prudent” levels of employee representation led to better board
decisionmaking by improving monitoring and thus reducing agency costs.161
“Armed with better information,” Larry Fauver and Michael Fuerst explain, “the
supervisory board may more easily recognize and thwart investments and
strategies that represent private control benefits to large shareholders or
management through asset stripping, pyramiding, dilution of small investors,
crony capitalism, and simple perquisites.”162 A similar finding was made by
157

See ADDISON, supra note 55, at 109. Those early studies were criticized for reasons
that included “sample size, data frequency (in the case of stock returns), lack of controls
for other relevant economic or organizational variables, focus on a single event, and
narrow reach.” Id.
158
See, e.g., Felix FitzRoy & Kornelius Kraft, Economic Effects of Codetermination,
95 SCAND. J. ECON. 365 (1993) (finding that the shift to quasi-parity codetermination
in 1976 had negative effect on productivity); Theodor Baums & Bernd Frick, Codetermination in Germany: The Impact of Court Decisions on the Market Value of
Firms, 1 ECON. ANALYSIS 143 (1998) (finding that court rulings that expanded or
restricted codetermination had no real effect on share price); Gary Gorton & Frank A.
Schmid, Capital, Labor, and the Firm: A Study of Codetermination, 2 J. EURO. ECON.
ASS’N 863 (2004) (finding that moving from one-third to quasi-parity codetermination
negatively affected shareholder wealth).
159
See, e.g., Felix FitzRoy & Kornelius Kraft, Co-determination, Efficiency, and
Productivity, 43 BRIT. J. IND. REL. 233 (2005); see also ADDISON, supra note 55, at
115-16, 120. The negative findings in the second phase of studies may have been
artefacts of the cross-section estimation they used, which (by definition) did not control
for firm heterogeneity or firm-specific effects. Id. at 115, 120.
160
See, e.g., Kornelius Kraft et al., Codetermination and Innovation, 35 CAMBRIDGE J.
ECON. 145 (2011); see also ADDISON, supra note 55, at 116.
161
See Larry Fauver & Michael E. Fuerst, Does Good Corporate Governance Include
Employee Representation? Evidence from German Corporate Boards, 82 J. FIN. ECON.
673 (2006); see also Renaud, supra note 120.
162
See Fauver & Fuerst, supra note 164, at 703.
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Kornelius Kraft and Marija Ugarković, who found that the 1976 strengthening
of codetermination positively affected returns on equity.163 Uwe Jirjahn,
summing up the studies in early 2010, reported that codetermination was
connected to higher productivity, and that more recent studies (unlike earlier
ones) had found that codetermination also had a positive effect on profitability
and capital market valuation.164 This third, rather optimistic phase of assessment
brought us right up to one of the most profound tests of all systems of corporate
governance: the global financial crisis of 2008.
The financial crisis did not spare any of the world’s major economies, but
some recovered more quickly than others. Germany, in particular, recovered
more quickly and more thoroughly than many other countries, and did so, at least
in part, because of its corporate governance model.165 Economic downturns are
always difficult for companies and their employees. But codetermination allows
the management of many companies “to more easily seek the consent of its
workforce for carrying out more or less drastic measures.”166 These measures
include a system (Kurzarbeit) that temporarily reduces the working hours (and
salaries) of many of the employees.167 This avoids painful layoffs and allows
companies to retain their core workforces, which in turn allowed the economy
as a whole to avoid the worst of the economic slump.168 This led one group of
scholars to conclude: “Particular to Germany was the social partners’
willingness to work together during this specific economic hardship. . . . it
cannot be denied that the quality of industrial relations was a factor in
overcoming the crisis.”169
163

See Kornelius Kraft & Marija Ugarković, Gesetzliche Mitbestimmung und
Kapitalrendite, 226 JAHRBÜCHER FUR NATIONALÖKONOMIE UND STATISTIK 588
(2006).
164
See Jirjahn, supra note 158, at 52.
165
See Jean J. du Plessis et al., Preface to GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN
INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT, supra note 53, at vii; Sandrock, supra note
61, at 136. For some brief comparisons of the German recovery to that of other
countries, see Michael Burda & Jennifer Hunt, What Explains the German Labor
Market Miracle in the Great Recession?, 2011 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC
ACTIVITY 273-75.
166
See Sandrock, supra note 61, at 134.
167
See id.; Sandrock & du Plessis, supra note 53, at 188-89, 193.
168
See Lutz Bellman et al., The German Labour Market Puzzle in the Great Recession,
in PRODUCTIVITY PUZZLES ACROSS EUROPE 187, 187-88 (Philippe Askenazy et al.
eds., 2016); Sandrock, supra note 61, at 134; Sandrock & du Plessis, supra note 53, at
188-89, 193.
169
Bellman et al., supra note 171, at 229.
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There are, of course, some caveats to this story. The labor stockpiling that
smoothed over the effects of the recession was tailor-made for the particular
economic woes that hit Germany: a short-term demand shock that primarily
affected the manufacturing sector.170 More typically, German employment
follows GDP, sometimes with a slight delay.171 But the system worked
surprisingly well this time around, and the resulting difference between
Germany and the United States was apparent in the early part of the recovery
period.172
A number of new studies came out during the period of recovery that were
consistent with the third phase of the literature, showing that codetermination
generally had positive economic effects. One of the stronger results came from
a 2019 study by Simon Jager, Benjamin Schoefer, and Jörg Heining, which
showed that shared governance was “associated with an increase in capital
formation and a shift towards more capital intensive production,” probably
because it facilitated cooperation between firms and their employees.173
Shareholders, on this account, may be better off investing in firms where
employees have a stronger governance role. Other studies were more
circumspect. One model by Kornelius Kraft found that codetermination did not
significantly affect productivity in either direction.174 And a note of caution was
introduced by an event study by Stefan Petry, who showed that the expansion of
codetermination in 1976 was correlated with a decrease in share price at the
time.175
Overall, however, we think it’s fair to say that the emerging consensus of
the studies of the effects of codetermination on firm performance is quite
positive. A number of studies have shown that employee representation is
accompanied by higher productivity, profitability, and capital investment. And
it’s clear that codetermination contributed to Germany’s ability to recover from
170
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the global financial crisis much more quickly than other countries without strong
systems of employee representation. Shareholders have fared pretty well. But
how does codetermination affect the fortunes of other corporate constituents?
B. The Effect of Codetermination on Other Stakeholders
A number of recent studies have demonstrated the effects of
codetermination on a range of corporate constituents. We start here with the
obvious constituents—employees. One would expect that employees would lead
the pack of constituents expected to gain from more direct board representation.
And, in fact, employees do appear to be better off under codetermination, at least
by their own measures. But, as foretold by the story of German employment
during the global financial crisis, those employees may measure success in ways
that aren’t limited to the size of their paychecks.
As described above, Germany’s bounce back from the financial crisis was
largely a result of the ability of firms to keep employment levels relatively stable.
Those employment levels, however, did not come costlessly: they were
maintained at the price of the number of hours worked, bonuses (or the lack of
them), and resulting lower wages and salaries. But this is exactly the kind of deal
that employees bargained for under the Kurzarbeit system.
A recent study by E. Han Kim, Ernst Maug, and Christoph Scheider
confirmed that employees at full-parity codetermined firms are better protected
against layoffs during industry downturns.176 This job security, however, comes
at the price of significantly lower wages. Employees at codetermined firms pay
a premium equal to 3.3 percent of their wages for this employment insurance.177
Importantly, this swap of wages for job security has no effect on shareholders
one way or the other.178 This is similar to the finding by Jager, Schofer, and
Heining, who concluded that “we did not find that installing worker
representatives in German supervisory boards increased wages in these firms,
nor did it lead to more rent sharing.”179 This suggests, then, that this feature of
176
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employment insurance at codetermined firms was not a result of employee
entrenchment in the form of employee-manager collusion, and it did not come
at the expense of other corporate constituents.180 Kornelius Kraft, however,
found that while codetermination did not affect productivity, it did lead to a
significant increase in employee bargaining power and affected the distribution
of rents.181
That’s not to say, however, that codetermination does not affect other
corporate constituents. Employee representation, for example, turns out to be
good for creditors. Employees have interests that align with those of creditors
along a couple of dimensions. As Chen Lin, Thomas Schmid, and Yuhai Xuan
explained in a 2018 study, “Employee representatives who aim to protect the
interests of the firm’s employees can (unintentionally) also help to protect the
interests of banks as both stakeholders are interested in the long-term survival
and stability of the firm.”182 For that reason, employee representation and bank
ownership can act as “substitutes” for one another.183
The result of this interest alignment redounds to the benefit of both the firm
and the banks. The study found that codetermination was associated with
favorable financing conditions, lower costs of debt, longer debt maturities, and
fewer covenants.184 Codetermined firms were also found to have entered into
fewer and better merger and acquisition deals, had more stable cash flows, and
were exposed to less idiosyncratic risk.185 The authors of the study concluded
that “a direct voice of employees in firms’ governance structure can be a
powerful mechanism to reduce agency conflicts between debt providers and
firms and to improve their financing opportunities and conditions.”186
Creditors aren’t the only other constituents that might benefit from
employee representation. Scholz and Vitols recently evaluated the impact of
codetermination on a firm’s commitment to substantive corporate social
responsibility (CSR) measures.187 The study was novel in several respects.
Unlike earlier work, which assumed that worker influence was the same at all
180
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codetermined firms, the authors developed measure of the strength of
codetermination based on a number of factors, including obvious ones such as
the level of codetermination (one-third, quasi, or full) and less obvious ones such
as the extent of worker representation on board committees and the importance
of the supervisory board in firm governance.188 The study was also the first to
look at the effect of codetermination on CSR outcomes.189
The authors found that the strength of codetermination was positively
related to substantive CSR policies, including setting concrete goals on emission
reductions, the publication of a separate CSR report (or section in its annual
report), and the presence of a job security (no-layoff) policy.190 These were
deemed “substantive” CSR measures because they required an expenditure or
investment in company resources.191 There was not a corresponding relationship
to merely symbolic measures, indicating that employee representatives have
little interest in measures that do not result in direct improvements for
workers.192
The recent performance of the German economy has begun to change the
way people view codetermination. By 2016, its popularity among the German
people rose to an all-time high.193 The German business community looks at it
in a more positive light,194 and foreign businesspeople—long baffled by the
complex codetermination laws—have come to see some of its advantages.195 In
sum, this new economic research suggests that employee representation on
corporate boards benefits employees, creditors, and the broader community
through the pursuit of meaningful CSR measures. Employees are often able to
secure greater job security (though at some expense to their wages) in a way that
avoids hold-up issues. Their representation also seems to help other corporate
constituents through a variety of mechanisms including the promotion of greater
information flow within the firm and the fact that other constituents often have
interests that align with those of employees (such as a concern for the long-term
health and stability of the firm). In any case, the results of these recent studies
188
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are quite clear: codetermination benefits a wide range of corporate constituents
at little or no cost to shareholders.
V. CONCLUSION
As the dogma of shareholder primacy is reevaluated, the structure and
experience of the codetermination model deserves examination. The success of
the German system serves as an empirical rejoinder to the hypothetical
arguments used by law and economics scholars to justify the exclusive
shareholder franchise. Codetermination was born of consensual agreement at a
time when labor and capital had roughly equal bargaining power, and only later
became enshrined in law. As a result, they developed a system that is
dramatically more employee-oriented than Anglo-American corporate law. The
standard thinking in U.S. corporate circles would predict—and has predicted—
the failure of this deviant system. But German firms have not been paralyzed by
more heterogeneous board electorates. And they have not been destroyed by
voting cycles. Rather, they have in many important ways outperformed their
United States counterparts. The arguments against employee representation
were already in trouble on their own theoretical terms. The presence of a
significant, well-functioning counterexample to shareholder primacy should be
further cause to question.
Does this mean that German-style codetermination is without faults? Of
course not.196 The system has been criticized for its large, two-tiered board
structures.197 It makes use of an (arguably) unnecessarily baroque version of an
electoral college to elect employee representatives.198 And the recent success of
the German system also doesn’t mean that it would directly translate to
corporations in the United States. Perhaps supervisory codetermination can only
flourish in conjunction with the strong union presence and works councils found
in Germany. (Or perhaps it’s the other way around.)
Nevertheless, German codetermination is working well enough that it helps
confirm many of the arguments made in favor of a shared approach to corporate
governance. We hope that this review of codetermination spurs American
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scholars to consider the German model and reimagine the possibilities for a more
efficient and more just framework for corporate law.
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